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On Minor Publications, Thematic Divisions, and Biases in Philosophy: Insights from the Book Review Sections

Anna Leuschner
LEIBNIZ UNIVERSITÄT HANNOVER

Anna Lindemann
SIGMUND FREUD UNIVERSITY

ON THE DATA SITUATION

In 2008, Sally Haslanger investigated, among other things, the underrepresentation of women's work in top philosophical journals by quantitatively examining the distribution of author gender. She concentrated on articles and discussions, finding contributions from female authors to be underrepresented—about 12.36 percent on average—vis-à-vis the number of women in the philosophical discipline overall.

When Haslanger published her paper, there was no access to journal submission data, making it impossible to ascertain whether the problem stems from a difference in the submission or the acceptance rate (or both). Subsequently, new data have come to light, provided by the American and the British Philosophical Associations in 2014. Gender-specific numbers were provided by Mind, The Philosophical Quarterly, The European Journal of Philosophy, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and The British Journal for the History of Philosophy for the time between 2011–2013/2014. According to this data the journals’ acceptance rates are roughly equal for women and men. However, with the exception of the Canadian Journal (20 percent of submissions by women), the submission rates of women in all the journals were very low (10 percent, 14 percent, 11.84 percent, 12 percent, and 16 percent).

Both studies—Haslanger’s paper and the APA/BPA survey—left us asking ourselves how women philosophers’ books are treated in the book review sections of philosophical journals. In order to benefit from Haslanger’s findings, we chose from her list those journals that include book review sections, i.e., Ethics, Mind, The Journal of Philosophy, and The Philosophical Review. However, the book review section in the Journal of Philosophy is so small that it did not allow for a workable amount of data (even if we went back until 2003). Thus, we focused on Ethics, Mind, and Phil. Review and examined their book review sections between 2008 and 2015 by collating the numbers of reviewed books authored by men and women as well as the numbers of male and female reviewers. We also correlated the number of female reviewers when a reviewed book was authored by a woman.

Before starting, let us issue two caveats. First, the three journals of this survey make only a small sample. Second, as the APA/BPA survey, Haslanger’s survey, and our own survey all scrutinize different periods of time, combining them might not be unproblematic—not least since some philosophy journals’ practices have changed in recent years, partly as a result of concerns about biases in review procedure. For example, two of the surveyed journals have triple- and one only double-blind review procedures: for example, two of the surveyed journals have triple- and one only double-blind review procedures: Mind started the editorial practice of triple-anonymity in 2005, Ethics even earlier, in 1991.

Nevertheless, we hope and believe that these collections of data—each taken separately and all of them combined—may contribute to recent and new ideas on this issue, and we wish to stress that it would be very helpful if more editors, institutions, and researchers gathered and released (gender-specific) data in order to achieve a better understanding of the situation.

DATA FROM THE BOOK REVIEW SECTIONS

The survey of the book review sections points to the following three key points (at the very least):

76. The 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 allows public housing agents to exclude both drug offenders and felons ’believed to be using illegal drugs or abusing alcohol—whether or not they have been convicted of a crime. Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 142, original emphasis. In addition, the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) “one strike and you are out” guidelines adopted soon after this allows public-housing tenants who have a guest or member of their household engaging in criminal activity on or off the premises to be evicted, whether or not they knew of the criminal activity. Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, 142–44. Since felons are barred for at least five years following the federal public housing, allowing them on the premises would constitute an eviction-worthy offense.
78. Ibid., 308.
80. See Patterson’s insightful chapter, “Slavery as Human Parasitism,” ibid., 334–42.
84. For a wealth of data on all of these points, in the context of a philosophical analysis of the political perils of America’s ongoing de facto racial segregation, see Elizabeth Anderson’s excellent book, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University, Reprint edition, 2013), chapters one and two.
85. For discussion of the paucity of resources offered to women in prison, see Joanne Belknap, “Access to Programs and Healthcare for Incarcerated Women,” Federal Probation 60, no. 4 (December 2006).
(1) While one might expect women’s books to be underrepresented in the book review sections due to a bias against women’s work, the numbers collated here do not confirm such a bias in these journals’ book selections. In Ethics, 26.02 percent of the reviewed books are authored by women, in Mind 14.26 percent, and in Phil. Review 17.22. Thus, the attention that women’s work receives appears particularly high in Ethics. Yet, this appearance may be deceptive since Ethics is a journal that addresses an area of philosophy in which women are actually overrepresented.

Overall, the reviewed books authored by women come to an average of 18.33 percent. One might be tempted to interpret this finding as an indication of bias against women’s work in the review sections should roughly correlate with their number in the community—so if we take the latter to be between 20 and 25 percent, the former should correspond accordingly. However, this interpretation has a number of problems.

First, it should be kept in mind here that these top journals primarily consider work from people who are already part of “the establishment” and, thus, are perceived to be excellent. However, it is less common for women to reach these upper-career echelons than for men. Second, as mentioned above, the APA/BPA (2014) data reveals that women tend to submit significantly less than their male colleagues. Accordingly, women might also submit book manuscripts less often than men. In sum, we therefore wish to stress that the data does not suggest that there are biases against women’s work in the journals’ book selection. However, the data also does not provide grounds for a positive assessment of the selection of books by these journals (partially Mind).

(2) Women are more strongly represented as review authors than article authors in all three journals (Figure 1). A potential explanation might be that women do not often decline requests for book reviews because, as a rule, they do not receive much support, have inadequate working conditions, and, hence, do not feel that they can afford to reject review requests. This would be in line with an “internalized negative self-evaluation” of women philosophers. Moreover, it would fit with the fact that writing a book review counts more as “community service” than as a scientific achievement; it is a “minor publication.” At the same time, however, it is “considerably time consuming” while the reviews have a “shorter shelf life than articles, since they tend to relate the book to the current contextual environment.” Thus, book reviews cause a significant amount of work and come with comparatively low prestige—a classic women’s task.

(3) There is a notable tendency that the percentage of women reviewers is higher when the reviewed books are authored by women (Figure 2). Note, however, that the occurrence of same-gender constellations is significant only in Ethics (p = .021).

Diverse factors could be in play here. Sometimes, men might tend to avoid reviewing women’s books for fear of having to be particularly considerate in their criticism due to otherwise appearing sexist and biased; on the other hand, women could tend to accept requests to review other women’s books more often for feminist reasons.

Yet, the most relevant factor seems to be a thematic division between “hard” (epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) and “soft” (ethics, applied ethics, social and political philosophy) areas of philosophy, the former reportedly more a domain of men, the latter reportedly more of women. Given that there is a statistically significant trend only in Ethics and also given the salient percentage of reviewed books authored by women in the same journal (28.06 percent), it seems that women have been able to establish a foothold in specific topics, particularly in ethics—e.g., care ethics, feminist bioethics, intersectionality, ecofeminism, embodiment, standpoint epistemology, or feminist science studies. Therefore, the trend in Ethics confirms the suspicion that there are gender-specific areas in philosophy because, if this is the case, there are more books on specific issues authored by women than by men, and more competent women than men are available for reviewing the respective books, meaning that editors simply can find more women experts on these topics.

SUMMARY AND FURTHER DISCUSSION

The most notable finding of this study is that women are more strongly represented as review authors than article...
authors in all three journals. We argued that this exemplifies the well-known fact that women tend to do work of lesser prestige more often since book reviews count as “minor publications” while requiring a lot of work. Moreover, the data reveals a notable tendency that the percentage of women reviewers is higher when the reviewed books are authored by women. We argued that this supports the hypothesis that women philosophers tend to focus on specific thematic areas.

These points are interesting with respect to the discussion of gender biases in peer review. While proponents of implicit bias approaches have claimed occasionally that there is a propensity (of referees, editors, etc.) to reject women’s contributions to philosophical journals, the APA/BPA (2014) data does not support this suspicion. Still, in light of the low submission rates by women and the substantial gender differences in the book review sections, we wish to emphasize that this does not mean that gender bias does not play a role when it comes to the underrepresentation of women’s articles in philosophy journals.

Implicit and explicit biases against women and members of minority groups have been elucidated thoroughly by substantial current research. For this reason, we take it as given that there are gender biases playing a decisive role in causing the underrepresentation of women in all areas of academic philosophy including publications—even though most people might successfully take efforts to make unbiased decisions, e.g., when it comes to the evaluation of one’s work. Thus, it seems rather unlikely that biases keep editors away from accepting women’s submissions. However, gender biases are likely to lead to a “chilly climate,” inadequate working conditions, and “internalized negative self-evaluation,” which might interfere with and deflate women’s confidence and stifle their productivity. This might very well explain why women philosophers do work of lesser prestige more often, focus on specific thematic areas (i.e., “thematic niches”), and submit substantially less often than their male colleagues.

The empirical findings presented here add, once again, weight to this hypothesis.

ANNEX: DATA

Data are only taken for reviews of single-authored monographs when they are written by no more than two reviewers. Each reviewer of a co-authored review is counted as 0.5 in order to maintain an alignment between the total number of reviews and reviewers.

TABLE 1: BOOK REVIEWS IN ETHICS, 2008–2015, VOL. 118 (2)–VOL. 126 (1)

<table>
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<th>Author (m)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>177.5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>229.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>319</td>
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</table>

TABLE 2: BOOK REVIEWS IN MIND, 2008–2015, VOL. 117–VOL. 124

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<th>Author (f)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reviewer (f)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reviewer (m)</td>
<td>380.5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>437.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>474.5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>553.5</td>
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</table>

TABLE 3: BOOK REVIEWS IN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 2008–2015, VOL. 117–VOL. 124

<table>
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<th>Author (m)</th>
<th>Author (f)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reviewer (m)</td>
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<tr>
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TABLE 4: ARTICLE DATA FROM HASLANGER (2008, 220)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Journal</th>
<th>Article authors</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Review</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.38</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many thanks to Philip Kitcher, Janet Kourany, Torsten Wilholt, and Jo Wolff for discussions on various points of the findings. Thanks also for the valuable comments by the referees of this journal and two previous journals. Earlier versions were presented at the PSA 2016 in Atlanta and the Inclusion and Exclusion in Philosophy workshop that took place in Hanover in 2017. Anna Leuschner’s research for this paper was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) as part of the research training group GRK 2073, Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research.

NOTES

1. Anna Leuschner is responsible for the data collection and interpretation, Anna Lindemann for the statistical evaluation.
2. APA/BPA Journal Surveys.
3. As Weisberg ("Journal Submission Rates by Gender: A Look at the APA/BPA Data") has pointed out, the APA/BPA data has to be taken with a pinch of salt. "A good number of the usual suspects aren’t included, like Philosophical Studies, Analysis, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy. So the usual worries about response rates and selection bias apply. The data are also a bit haphazard and incomplete. Fewer than half of the journals that responded included gender data. And some of those numbers are suspiciously round."
4. This information was very supportively provided by the journal editors, Prof. Adrian Moore and Prof. Thomas Baldwin (Mind), as well as Prof. Henry Richardson (Ethics). For more information on triple-anonymity in Ethics, see also Richardson, Editorial (Ethics); and “Announcing an Improvement to the Journal’s Blind Review Process.”

5. For the exact numbers, see annex. With regard to ambiguous names of authors, we checked homepage or other internet sources (conference websites, book descriptions, etc.) for pictures and personal pronouns.


7. The number of books written by women that received reviews divided by the total number of book reviews: 193/1053 = 18.33.

8. Women hold around 21 percent of available permanent positions in the 1990s (Norlock, “Update on the Report to the APA-CSW from 2006”), and recent estimates suggest that there has not been substantial improvement ever since. In particular, it has been shown that the underrepresentation increased significantly when moving up the academic hierarchy from lower to higher positions: women receiving a PhD in philosophy make up roughly 31 percent of recipients (Leslie et al., “Expectations of Brilliance Under the Gender Distribution Across Academic Disciplines”; and Wilhelms et al., “New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals: 2004–2015”) and Schwyzergeb and Jennings (“Women in Philosophy”) have shown that women comprise, at most, 25 percent of all the philosophy faculty, occupying 37 percent of assistant, 29 percent of associate, and only 20 percent of full professors.


12. This is also supported by Wilhelm et al. (“New Data on the Representation of Women in Philosophy Journals: 2004–2015”), who have shown that women authors are better represented in discussion articles than in research articles. See, e.g., “Science and Gender: Scientists Must Work Harder on Equality.”

13. For the exact numbers, see annex. The p-values for Mind (p = .073) and for Philosophical Review (p = .153) are not significant; p-values are calculated using Fisher’s Exact Test.


REFERENCES


BOOK REVIEWS

The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration

Reviewed by Amy Reed-Sandoval
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO,
AMYREEDSANDOVAL@GMAIL.COM

In Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration: Liberty, Security, and Equality, José Jorge Mendoza argues for what he calls a “minimalist defense of immigrant rights.” In particular, his minimalist defense entails that “the burden of proof ought to be on legitimate states to justify any immigration restrictions and not on immigrants to defend their movement across international borders” (xvi).

While he calls his proposal minimalist in nature, Mendoza advocates, in this book, a sweeping variety of “migrant-friendly” policies. Some examples of these include the following: (1) a rejection of “prevention through deterrence”—a policy adopted in the 1990s that served to militarize the Mexico-US border at urban ports of entry and funnel unauthorized migrants into the Sonoran desert, where they are far more likely to die of dehydration, starvation or assault; (2) a rejection of “attrition through enforcement,” a complex strategy on the part of various actors and social institutions to make life so difficult for undocumented migrants that they “give up and deport themselves” (107, quoting Mark Krikorian); (3) amnesty for undocumented migrants; (4) the expansion of guest worker programs; (5) the rejection of deportations of legal permanent residents (including those who may have committed crimes); (6) a consideration of past injustices—such as colonialism—in the crafting of future immigration policy; and (7) a move toward immigration policies and reforms that “aim to make future immigration less a matter of necessity, and more a matter of an option for people” (128).

In addition to his stated goal of advocating a minimalist conception of immigrant rights, Mendoza also sets out to demonstrate that “immigration might be the most pressing issue that moral and political philosophers have to grapple with today” (xxi). Indeed, he states that “immigration is not simply a new riddle on which philosophers try out their competing conceptions of justice. Immigration is an important issue to consider because it exposes the limits of our current conceptions of justice and in doing so challenges us to rethink them” (xxi). In this review, I will first explore Mendoza’s project of conveying to readers the philosophical complexity and urgency of “the immigration question.” As I shall soon discuss, I believe that Mendoza is immensely successful in achieving this goal. Second, I shall turn to Mendoza’s arguments for a minimalist conception of immigrant rights. While I am most sympathetic to Mendoza’s arguments—and consider them to be a tremendously significant contribution to the ethics and political philosophy of immigration—I shall raise an objection to the scope of Mendoza’s arguments and also identify some methodological questions that linger for me after reading the book.

Throughout The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration: Liberty, Security, and Equality, Mendoza takes the reader on something of a voyage through much of the history of political philosophy. He does this in order to demonstrate that the philosophical complexity of “the question of immigration” cuts deep into a range of broad, trenchant debates in which political philosophers have engaged. Mendoza argues that we (that is, the “we” of society, as well as the “we” of the historical and contemporary communities of political philosophers) have long been trapped in what he describes in terms of two dilemmas: a liberty dilemma and a security dilemma.

The “security concern and security dilemma” likely stems from early arguments from philosophers like Hobbes, who claimed that our desire for security in the state of nature has compelled us to relinquish a great deal of our autonomy to something like a powerful sovereign. Mendoza reads Hobbes—and the security concern and security dilemma—into the US Plenary Power Doctrine, which “allows the federal government to admit, exclude, and deport noncitizens as it sees fit,” (10) without any judicial review or oversight. Engaging the work of Agamben, he argues that this effort to escape concerns about security in the so-called state of nature—particularly in the realm of immigration and the Plenary Power Doctrine—has brought about a “state of exception” in which the sovereign is exempt from the very laws it creates. This unchecked power of the sovereign actually makes citizens more vulnerable to the sovereign than they would have been under the State of Nature.

Mendoza then explains that in the United States, under the Plenary Power Doctrine, noncitizens are in a “constant state of exception,” having “basically been abandoned by the United States government” (10). This should be an appalling conclusion, he argues, for anyone who believes that justice demands that “something be in place to protect all citizens against such absolute and arbitrary exercises of power” (10). Ultimately, Mendoza argues—partly by way of referencing key cases of immigration law, in which the Supreme Court came to the defense of noncitizens (and I’ll add that this book is most noteworthy for its careful assessment of US immigration law in particular)—that we can escape the security dilemma through a functioning constitutional democracy that features both constitutional protections and judicial review (15).